Many Sub-Saharan African countries are extremely poor. It has been argued that the marriage system -in particular polygyny -is one contributing factor to the lack of development in this region. Polygyny leads to low incentives to save, depressing the capital stock and output. Enforcing monogamy might seem like an obvious solution. However, such a law will have winners and losers. In this paper, we investigate the transition from a polygynous to a monogamous steady state.
Introduction
Sub-Saharan African countries are generally very poor and have been stagnating over the last 40 years. Several different explanations have been proposed, ranging from colonial origin and bad institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001) to tropical climate and diseases (Bloom and Sachs 1998) . Most countries in SSA are highly polygynous. The number of married men in polygynous unions ranges from 10.2 in Malawi to 55.6 percent in Cameroon. This region is also characterized by extremely high fertility, a high age gap between spouses, and low savings rates. Tertilt (2005) argues that polygyny causes high fertility and low incentives to save and thereby contributes to underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
The economics of polygyny was pioneered by Becker (1974) and Grossbard (1978) and further developed by Bergstrom (1994) . Several authors have investigated the economic significance of marriage payments (e.g. Anderson (2003) , Botticini and Siow (2003) , Zhang and Chan (1999) ). Recently, a small literature has emerged analyzing the link between marriage institutions and economic outcomes (Jacoby (1995) , Edlund (1999) , Edlund and Lagerloef (2004) , Lagerloef (2005) , and Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2004) ). Tertilt (2005) argues that polygyny might be bad for economic development: Polygyny raises demand for wives, which increases the equilibrium brideprice. While men make payments to obtain brides, they are also the recipients of these payments when they sell their daughters. Women thus function as a good investment opportunity, providing income for retirement. This scheme can crowd out investment in physical assets, lowering the aggregate capital stock and consequently GDP per capita. In a calibrated version of the model, Tertilt (2005) argues that enforcing a ban on polygyny might decrease fertility by 40%, increase the savings rate by 70%, and increase output per capita by 170%.
If enforcing monogamy raises output, then an obvious questions is: should countries in SSA be encouraged to give up their traditions and adopt a law that prescribes monogamy? The United Nations, for example, have been pursuing such a policy.
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To address this question, one needs to know how the economy would adjust to a change in the marriage law. In this paper we analyze the transitional dynamics following a marriage reform. We study how rapidly the economy converges to the new, higher-savings steady state. We also identify the winners and losers along the transition path.
The results may shed some light on recent experiences in countries like Gambia, Togo, and the Ivory Coast that have made polygyny illegal, yet, enforcement has proven difficult. Several countries in SSA have officially banned polygyny, yet the prevalence of polygyny remains high (Tertilt (2006) ). While some of this resistance may be due to cultural factors, we show in this paper that there are also strong economic forces that work against moving to a monogamous society. While output might increase in the long run, we find that initial generations of men are clear losers from the marriage reform.
Some of the women alive during the reform period benefit from the change in marriage laws, however, their gain is not large enough to compensate the men. Hence, it is difficult to argue that enforcing monogamy is unambiguously beneficial.
Model
The model is the same as described in Tertilt (2005) . While the original paper focuses exclusively on a steady state comparison, this paper investigates transitional dynamics, which requires some additional notation. We analyze an infinite-horizon, overlapping generations model of marriage, fertility, and savings. People live for one period as a child and for two adult periods. They make choices only during the adult periods.
Young adults are endowed with one unit of labor which they supply inelastically at wage w t . People derive utility from consumption in both adult periods and from the total . That is, for a man, the per child cost falls if he has more wives. We assume that half of the children are female. Omitting all time subscripts, the problem of a man can then be summarized as Women have the same utility function and the same wage income as men. However, they are much more constrained in their choices. A woman takes her father's marriage decision and her husband's fertility decision as given, and makes only consumption and saving decisions.
There is an aggregate technology that uses capital and labor to produce the consumption good. The production technology is described by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, We assume that the economy starts in the steady state associated with the absence of marriage legislation, calibrated to the average polygynous country as in Tertilt (2005) .
We denote by period t = 0 the initial steady state. A reform that enforces monogamy is carried out in the middle of period t = 1, after marriage decisions have taken place, but before consumption and fertility decisions have been made.
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That is, the first period in which all new marriages are monogamous is period t = 2. Of course, fertility and consumption choices already adjust in period t = 1, in anticipation of the falling demand for brides. The government is committed to the reform and enforces it perfectly. The reform is not expected by any household, but once it is carried out, all agents correctly believe that it stays in place forever.
The problem of a man who is old during the reform period is
where the subscript ss denotes steady state values, which were chosen before the reform was announced. All men from period 1 onward must choose whether to marry when young or when old (i.e. n y = 1 or n o = 1).
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After the reform, the problem of a man can 3 This is the only timing that makes sense. Alternatively, if a reform was passed after fertility decisions had been made, then there would be a generation of men who would not be able to repay their loans.
Since the model does not allow for default, we do not consider this possibility. 4 The option of not marrying at all can be ignored without loss of generality because of our assumption that marriage is a prerequisite for having children.
be written as
Note that in period 1, all young women are already married to the initial old men, hence, marriage market clearing requires all initially young men to wait a period and marry when old. As long as there is positive population growth, then from period t = 2 onward, some young women will marry old men, and the rest of the young women will marry young men. The brideprice will adjust to assure that men are indifferent about the timing of marriage.
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Along the transition then, there will be (ex-post) different types of men, i, those who marry with an age gap (i = ag) and those who have a same age bride (i = sa). We denote the indirect utility of a type i man of generation t with V i t . Further, let M i t be the number of men of generation t of type i. The composition of types will change along the transition to the new monogamous steady state. • For i = sa, ag and for all t, given prices, (c
Definition 1 A reform equilibrium for this economy are sequences of consumption
{c y (i) t , c o t (i), c y f t (i), c o f t (i)} i,t , savings {s y t (i), s y t (i), s f t (i)} i,t ,y (i) t , c o (i) t , s y (i) t , s o (i) t ,
f t (i)) solves the man's problem (1).
5 Women are typically not indifferent between marrying a young or an old man. However, since marriage is not a choice for women, a utility differential between different women is consistent with equilibrium.
•
• • Marriage market clearing:
, where the superscript f describes the choices from the women's problems.
• Profit maximization holds:
, where
Results
A marriage reform that enforces monogamy drastically reduces demand for brides, which immediately affects the brideprice. It falls within one period from $1,000 to negative $1,700.
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This has tremendous effects on the initial old men. They had married many brides in anticipation of having many daughters who they could sell at a high price and use to finance old age consumption. Instead, suddenly daughters are a liability. Thus, the fertility rate falls very rapidly. The initial old men reduce their fertility from 12.5 to 7.5 children. In the polygynous steady state, men had an average of 2.5 wives, who had 5 children each, which lead to a total of 12.5 kids per man. The initial old men also have 2.5 wives each -recall that the reform is passed after marriages have taken place 6 The left hand side is the number of men who want a bride at time t, while the right hand side describes the available brides. 7 The numerical results are based on the calibrated parameters as described in Tertilt (2005) . A model period should be interpreted as 15 years. The capital stock and output are the slowest to adjust, as can be seen from Figure   2 . Starting from about 0.9, it takes the capital-output ratio about 10 periods until it finally reaches its new steady state level of 2.8. Similarly, GDP per capita takes about GDP per capita takes the longest to adjust, as can be seen from Figure 2 . After 4 periods (=60 years), the gap between the polygynous and the monogamous steady state is only half-way closed.
While in the long run, the marriage law reform unambiguously increases output per capita, and thus future generations win, the reform also leads to losers along the transition. Figure 3 shows utility for each generation along the transition. It can be seen that all adult men who are alive during the reform period -men born one and two periods before the reform -are losers. Everyone else -all subsequent men, and all women -clearly wins.
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The reason that initially old men lose is easy to understand and has already been mentioned before: they unexpectedly lose the ability to cash in on their daughters. Initially young men also experience a loss in utility. In addition to losing the option to sell their daughters for profit, they are also hurt by the low interest rates in period 2 due to the increased capital stock. Thus, men who are young during the marriage reform lower both old age consumption and fertility dramatically, which decreases utility by a large amount.
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Initially young women are also hurt by the fall in interest rates. However, they benefit from the falling child-rearing costs due to the reduced fertility. In period 2 the higher capital stock has increased the wage income enough to compensate for the marriage constraints and lower interest rates, thus, generation 2 (and all subsequent) men will benefit from the reform.
If women do not vote, then the reform would clearly not pass majority voting, since no men alive at the time will benefit. If women did vote, at best one could have a tie, but only if all indifferent women voted in favor of the reform. Note also that women do not have enough resources to compensate the men for their losses. That is, there is no transfer scheme such that all adults in period 1 would benefit from the marriage reform. This is because the initially old women are indifferent and the initially young Finally, note that Pareto efficiency is not well-defined for environments with endogenous fertility. Using the concepts developed in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2004) , the above logic also immediately implies that no monogamous equilibrium with transfers exists that A-dominates the polygynous steady state equilibrium.
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This discussion raises doubts about whether enforcing monogamy would really be desirable for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
